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CIVIL PROCEDURE

SUE FIRST, ASK QUESTIONS LATER: WHAT THE
RECENT EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DECISIONS MEAN
FOR ATTORNEYS IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I.

INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of equitable estoppel has long been associated with the age-old
maxim that "no man may take advantage of his own wrong."' This doctrine can be
applied if an individual, by representing facts or concealing material facts, causes
another person to change his position to the detriment of the other person.2 The key
to equitable estoppel is whether the party asserting estoppel has been "misled to his
injury."3 Becausethis misleading is an important element, equitable estoppel cannot
be applied when "the knowledge
of both parties is equal, and nothing is done by the
'4
other.
the
mislead
to
one
Recently, in Black v. Lexington School District Two' the South Carolina
Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's equitable estoppel argument because
"settlement negotiations or statements expressing interest in settlement are
insufficient to give rise to a claim that a defendant is equitably estopped from
asserting the statute of limitations."6 The court found that an affidavit submitted by
the plaintiff's attorney was not sufficient to create an issue of fact concerning
equitable estoppel because the affidavit contained only assertions that the defendant
had expressed an interest in settling the case.' Although the Black court indicated
that statements expressing intent of settlement are not sufficient for a finding of
estoppel, the court did not elaborate on what type of conduct by the defendant
would sustain an estoppel argument.! Further, the court adhered to its ruling in
Gaymon v. RichlandMemorial Hospital:9 equitable estoppel is an issue for the

1. Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232 (1959).
2. Hubbard v. Beverly, 197 S.C. 476, 481, 15 S.E.2d 740, 742 (1941) (finding that the plaintiff
could not have been misled because he knew when he executed his will that he had already conveyed
the land at issue to someone else in fee simple).
3. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Ocean Forest, Inc., 275 S.C. 552,554,273 S.E.2d 773, 774
(1981).
4. Helsel v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, 307 S.C. 24, 28, 413 S.E.2d 821, 824 (1992).
5. 327 S.C. 55, 488 S.E.2d 327 (1997).
6. Id. at 63, 488 S.E.2d at 331.
7. Id. at 65, 488 S.E.2d at 332.
8. Id. at 63-64, 488 S.E.2d at 331-32.
9. 327 S.C. 66, 488 S.E.2d 332 (1997).
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judge, not the jury.'"
This Note will review Black and Gaymon and then discuss the current state of
South Carolina jurisprudence on equitable estoppel. Part II of this Note briefly
describes these two cases and considers what conduct on the part of the defendant
triggers the application of estoppel. Part III considers whether the court's decision
that settlement negotiations are insufficient to trigger estoppel is contrary to the
policy of encouraging settlement. Part IV discusses the court's ruling that equitable
estoppel is an issue for the judge and compares Gaymon to decisions of the federal
courts that allow equitable estoppel to go to the jury. Finally, this Note concludes
by suggesting ways in which attorneys can protect their clients during settlement
negotiations.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Black v. Lexington School District Two
InBlacktheplaintiff, Christopher Black, was injured at Brookland-Cayce High
School on March 27, 1991." Although the statute of limitations had run by August
8, 1993,12 Black's attorney did not serve a complaint on the school district until
February 8, 1995.13 The complaint alleged that the school district should be
equitably estopped from asserting a defense based on the statute of limitations
because the district had induced Black not to file a complaint. 4 At the initial
summary judgment hearing, Black attempted to present an affidavit from his
original lawyer" in support of his claim of equitable estoppel. 6 "Although the

document was a sworn statement it did not comply with South Carolina's
requirements for avalid affidavit because it was not notarized."' 7 The judge granted
10. Black, 327 S.C. at 62 n.1, 488 S.E.2d at 330-31 n.1.
11. Id. at 57, 488 S.E.2d at 328.
12. Under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, the statute of limitations for tort claims against
agovernment entity runs for two years. S.C. CODEANN. § 15-78-100(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). The
statute of limitations is extended for another year when the claimant files a "verified claim" pursuant
to section 15-78-80. Id. Additionally, when the claimant is a minor, the statute is tolled until the
claimant reaches majority. Black, 327 S.C. at 58,488 S.E.2d at 328. Black, who was seventeen at the
time of the injury, reached majority on August 8, 1991. Id. at 57, 488 S.E.2d at 328. Because he never
filed a verified claim, the statutory period ended on August 8, 1993. Id. at 58, 488 S.E.2d at 328.
13. Black, 327 S.C. at 58, 488 S.E.2d at 328.
14. Id.
15. Id.Although Black's first lawyer and the school district's insurance company had discussed
Black's claim, Black obtained new counsel before the school district's original summary judgment
hearing. Id.
16. Id. A revised affidavit alleged that the school district's insurance carrier had indicated that
both the school district and the carrierwere interested in settling the case. The affidavit also alleged that
the carrier's agent had indicated that he was confident that the matter could be settled if he could
complete the investigation and so there was no need to initiate litigation. Id. at 65, 488 S.E.2d at 332.
17. ld. at 58,488 S.E.2d at 328. Rule 11 ofthe South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Affidavits or verifications authorized or permitted under these Rules shall be
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Black a continuance and gave him the opportunity to "obtain a valid affidavit from
his former attorney."' 8 However, at a second hearing, the trial court found that the
affidavit had not been timely served and thus was not considered. 9 As a result, the
judge granted the school district's motion for summary judgment, concluding that
the statute of limitations had run.20 The supreme court found that the trial court had
not abused its discretion by refusing to consider the affidavit.2 The court further

opined that the school district would have been granted summary judgment even if
the affidavit had been admitted because the affidavit did not create an issue of
material fact regarding equitable estoppel.'

In making its decision, the Blackcourtlooked at prior South Carolina decisions
to determine whether the conduct of the school district or its insurance claims
adjuster was such that the doctrine of equitable estoppel would prevent it from
alleging the statute of limitations as a defense.' Under South Carolina law, "[a]
defendant may be estopped from claiming the statute of limitations as a defense if
'the delay that otherwise would give operation to the statute had been induced by
the defendant's conduct."' 24 Further the court noted in Wiggins v. Edwards25 that

written statements or declarations by a party or his attorney of record or of a
witness, sworn to or affirmed before an officer authorized to administer oaths,
that the affiant knows the facts stated to be true of his own knowledge, except as
to those matters stated on information and belief and as to those matters that he
believes them to be true.
S.C. R. Civ. P. 1 (c).
18. Black, 327 S.C. at 58, 488 S.E.2d at 328. Rule 56 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure provide:
Should it appear from the affidavits ofa party opposing the motion that he cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had
or may make such order as is just.
S.C. K.Civ. P. 56(f).
19. Black, 327 S.C. at 58, 488 S.E.2d at 328-29. At this second hearing, Black's attorney faxed
a notarized affidavit to the school district's attorney just three hours before the beginning ofthe hearing.
The school district argued that the affidavit was not served in accordance with Rule 56 of the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court agreed and refused to consider the affidavit. Id.
According to Rule 56(c), "[tlhe adverse party may serve opposing affidavits not later than two days
before the hearing." S.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
20. Black, 327 S.C. at 58-59, 488 S.E.2d at 329.
21. Following previous decisions, the court ruled that a "trial court may refuse to consider
materials that were not timely served such that the opposing party had no time to prepare a response."
Id. at 60, 488 S.E.2d at 329.
22. Id. at 65, 488 S.E.2d at 332.
23. Id. at 61-63, 488 S.E.2d at 330-32 (citing Vines v. Self Mem'l Hosp., 314 S.C. 305, 443
S.E.2d 909 (1994); Gadsden v. Southern R.t., 262 S.C. 590,206 S.E.2d 882 (1974); Moates v. Bobb,
322 S.C. 172, 470 S.E.2d 402 (Ct. App. 1996); Dillon County Sch. Dist. Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal
Works, Inc., 286 S.C. 207, 332 S.E.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1985)).
24. Wiggins v. Edwards, 314 S.C. 126, 130,442 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1994) (quoting Dillon County
Sch. Dist. Two, 286 S.C. at 218, 332 S.E.2d at 561).
25. 314 S.C. 126,422 S.E.2d 169 (1994).
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this inducement could be in the form of express statements which indicate that the
claim will be settled or through actions which suggest that litigation is not
necessary.26 Although less than a direct promise not to litigate may be enough to
warrant estoppel, a defendant's expressed interest in settlement or in unfinalized
settlement negotiations with the plaintiff will not estop a statute of limitations
defense.2 However, the court of appeals had previously applied estoppel in a case
in which assertions that litigation would not be necessary were accompanied by
additional conduct on the part of the defendant."
In Black the only evidence to support the plaintiff's estoppel claim was the
attorney's affidavit and some letters sent from the attorney to the school district's
claims adjuster.29 The attorney's affidavit merely indicated that the school district
was "'interested in settling the case."' 3 The court found that these statements did
not present a genuine issue of material fact about whether the defendant had
induced the plaintiff to delay bringing a claim." Thus, the court affirmed the order
of the circuit court granting summary judgment to the school district.32
B. Gaymon v. Richland Memorial Hospital
The Black court also reaffirmed its recent decision in Gaymon v. Richland
33 which
MemorialHospital,
adopted anew rule, that equitable estoppel is a question
of fact to be decided by ajudge.34 In Gaymon the plaintiffs commenced slip and fall
cases against Richland Memorial Hospital.35 The "[h]ospital asserted the statute of
limitations as an affirmative defense" and "moved for summary judgment."36 "The
trial judge denied summary judgment finding [the plaintiffs] had raised issues of
fact regarding" equitable estoppel.37 Although the hospital requested that the issue
of equitable estoppel be tried separately by the court in equity, the trial judge
refused and ruled that a jury should try the issue." The supreme court reversed,
holding that the issue was one for a court in equity.39 Accordingly, to reach ajury

26. Id. at 130, 422 S.E.2d at 171.
27. Moates, 322 S.C. at 175, 470 S.E.2d at 403.
28. Dillon County Sch. Dist. Two, 286 S.C. at 219, 332 S.E.2d at 562. In Dillon County School
District Two the court of appeals found that the defendant's visits to the school to discuss and
investigate the repairs needed and the defendant's repeated attempts to fix the roof indicated that the
roof would be fixed without resort to litigation. Id.
29. Black v. Lexington Sch. Dist. Two, 327 S.C. 55, 64, 488 S.E.2d 327, 332 (1997).
30. Id. at 65, 488 S.E.2d at 332 (quoting the affidavit).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 327 S.C. 66, 488 S.E.2d 332 (1997).
34. Black, 327 S.C. at 62 n.1, 488 S.E.2d at 330-31 n.1.
35. Gaymon, 327 S.C. at 67, 488 S.E.2d at 333.
36. Id.
37. Id
38. Id.
39. Id. at 68, 488 S.E.2d at 333. The South Carolina Supreme Court opined that the cases relied
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under Gaymon, a plaintiff must do more than raise an issue of material fact
concerning estoppel.
III. THE SPECTRUM OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL: WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE?
A. Knowledge andReliance: A Gray Area
The party seeking to assert equitable estoppel bears the burden of proof.40 That
party must establish "(1) [its own] lack of knowledge and the means of knowledge
ofthe truth as to the facts in question; and (2) reliance upon the conduct ofthe party
estopped"; 4' (3) "conduct by the party estopped which amounts to a false
representation or concealment of material facts";42 (4) "the intention [by the party
to be estopped] that such conduct shall be acted upon by the other party; and [(5)
the estopped party's] knowledge, actual or constructive, of the true facts."43 These
elements can be reduced to and considered as knowledge and reliance on conduct.
1. Knowledge of the Parties
For aplaintiffto successfully assert equitable estoppel, the defendant must have
some knowledge, actual or constructive, that the plaintiff lacks.' For example,
courts have estopped defendants from asserting the statute of limitations in workers'
compensation cases when the plaintiff's inexperience and lack of education led the
plaintiff to believe that the claim was being handled.4" In Clements v. Greenville
County46 the South Carolina Supreme Court found that the plaintiff, an employee
at one of the correctional institutions in Greenville County, was misled by his
employer into believing that his employer would take care of his workers'

compensation claim.47 The court noted that the plaintiff was sixty-two years old and
had only completed the seventh grade.4" The court also applied equitable estoppel

on by the trial court should be read "for the proposition that equitable estoppel may involve a question
of factfor the fact-finder." Id. The appropriate fact finder, however, is the judge and not the jury. Id.
40. Johns v. Johns, 309 S.C. 199, 203, 420 S.E.2d 856, 859 (Ct. App. 1992).
41. Id. at 203-04, 420 S.E.2d at 859.
42. Id. at 203, 420 S.E.2d at 859. However, the party against whom estoppel is being asserted
need nothave intentionally deceived the party invoking estoppel. See, e.g., Lovell v. C.A. Timbes, Inc.,
263 S.C. 384, 389, 210 S.E.2d 610, 612 (1974) ("In order to constitute estoppel it is not necessary to
establish deception, fraud, bad faith or an intent to deceive. ..."); Clements v. Greenville County, 246
S.C. 20, 23, 142 S.E.2d 212, 213 (1965) (noting that estoppel can arise from intentional or
unintentional deception).
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., Lovell, 263 S.C. at 389, 210 S.E.2d at 612 (noting that the worker's inexperience
and limited education would be considered by the court).
46. 246 S.C. 20, 142 S.E.2d 212 (1965).
47. Id. at 25, 142 S.E.2d at 214.
48. Id. at 23, 142 S.E.2d at 213.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1998

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 5 [1998], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 49:957

in a similar case in which the plaintiff informed his employer of his injury and was
then told to obtain the correct forms from the insurance agent, which the employer
filed.49 Later, an adjuster spoke to the plaintiff and took his statement, but never
contacted the plaintiff again."0 After the limitations period had run, the insurer
denied the claim and mailed a letter to the plaintiff informing him of their
decision. 5' The claimant had never filed a claim before, and only three other claims
had ever been filed by the employer."2 As in Clements, the supreme court
considered the plaintiff's lack of education and experience in deciding that he was
misled by both the insurance agent and his employer.5 3
Next, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the party against whom estoppel
is being asserted had "'knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts."'5 4 In
Brayboy v. Ewing" the plaintiffasserted thatthe defendant's conduct prevented her
from filing suit within the statute of limitations period. 6 The South Carolina Court
of Appeals found that the defendant doctor did not have the requisite knowledge
and was not equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations when the
plaintiff's condition could have resulted from many different causes and when the
evidence did not show that the defendant had conclusive knowledge of the
plaintiff's problems.5 7
Once a party has retained counsel, it is less likely that equitable estoppel will
be applied against the other party because an attorney may be presumed to have
access to the material facts of the case and, therefore, "the means of knowledge of
the truth as to the facts in question."" However, a court may also find that an
attorney has been misled and that estoppel is still applicable. In United States v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. 9 the Fourth Circuit ruled that "[a]n attorney may be
justifiably lulled into a sense of false security as much as his client. ' For example,
when the plaintiff has been misled on a matter of engineering, rather than a matter
of law, "lawyers have no special expertise in engineering... [and, as a result,]
presence of counsel is of little relevance in determining whether plaintiff reasonably
relied on the words and conduct of defendant." 6' Thus, South Carolina courts may
find that the knowledge requirement is met when an attorney alleges to have been

49. Lovell, 263 S.C. at 387, 210 S.E.2d at 611.
50. Id.
51. Id. at388, 210 S.E.2d at 611.
52. Id. at 389, 210 S.E.2d at 612.
53. Id. at 389-90, 210 S.E.2d at 612-13.
54. Southern Dev. Land & Golf Co. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 305 S.C. 507, 511,409
S.E.2d 428, 430 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Frady v. Smith, 247 S.C. 353, 359, 147 S.E.2d 412, 415
(1966)).
55. 311 S.C. 272, 428 S.E.2d 731 (Ct. App. 1993).
56. Id. at 274, 428 S.E.2d at 733.
57. Id. at 275, 428 S.E.2d at 733.
58. Johns v. Johns, 309 S.C. 199, 203, 420 S.E.2d 856, 859 (Ct. App. 1992).
59. 402 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1968).
60. Id. at 899.
61. City of Bedford v. James Leffel & Co., 558 F.2d 216, 219 n.17 (4th Cir. 1977).
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misled on a nonlegal issue.
2. Reliance
In addition to the knowledge element, a plaintiff must show reliance on the
conduct of the party to be estopped. 2 South Carolina courts have often ruled that
the reliance element has been met when the plaintiff was an employee of the
defendant. 3 The supreme court has tied reliance to the knowledge element,
implying that a plaintiff-employee with little knowledge and experience outside of
the skills required to perform the job is likely to rely on the employer to take care
of all job-related matters, especially those concerning work-related injuries.' The
plaintiff does not have to be of limited education or experience, however, to satisfy
the reliance element. For example, in Oswald v. County ofAiken65 the plaintiff
served as a deputy sheriff in a busy mobile crime lab. 6 The sheriff's department
normally allowed deputies to accumulate overtime and then later take time offfrom
work by crediting this time against their overtime. 7 The department paid the
deputies for any unused overtime when they left the department. 8 Oswald, unable
to use all of his overtime before he left the department, requested payment for the
unused hours when he resigned; the county, however, refused to compensate him.69
The court of appeals found that the plaintiff had relied on the department's policy
of overtime compensation and that the plaintiff had worked extra hours in
expectation of payment for unused overtime.7" As a result,the county was estopped
from denying that it had a policy of paying deputies for unused compensatory time
when they left the department.

A court will not always find reliance, however, simply because the defendant
assisted the plaintiff in filing a claim or because the plaintiff possessed less
knowledge than the defendant about filing claims.7' In Vines v. Self Memorial
Hospital,a non-employment situation, the South Carolina Supreme Court found no
evidence "that [the plaintiff] delayed filing suit in reliance on [the defendant's]

62. Johns, 309 S.C. at 203-04, 420 S.E.2d at 859.
63. See Lovell v. C.A. Timbes, Inc., 263 S.C. 384, 210 S.E.2d 610 (1974); Clements v. Greenville
County, 246 S.C. 20, 142 S.E.2d 212 (1965); Oswald v. County of Aiken, 281 S.C. 298, 315 S.E.2d
146 (Ct. App. 1984).
64. See Lovell, 263 S.C. at 389, 210 S.E.2d at 612; see also supra text accompanying notes 4753.
65. 281 S.C. 298, 315 S.E.2d 146 (Ct. App. 1984).
66. Id. at 301, 315 S.E.2d at 149.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 306, 315 S.E.2d at 151-52.
71. See, e.g., Vines v. Self Mem'l Hosp., 314 S.C. 305, 308, 443 S.E.2d 909, 911 (1994)
(rejecting plaintiff's argument that the hospital staff's completion of her claim forms estopped the
hospital from asserting a statute of limitations defense).
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conduct."72 In Vines the defendant hospital's employees assisted the plaintiff in
completing claims forms. 7a However, because the forms were not notarized, they
did not comply with the Tort Claims Act.74 Therefore, the plaintiffwas only entitled
to a two year statute of limitations,75 and the plaintiff did not file her claim within
the statutory period.76 The plaintiff alleged that the hospital was estopped from
asserting the statute of limitations because hospital staff helped her complete the
77
claims forms, causing "'her to believe she had done all that she needed to do.'
The court disagreed and held that the plaintiff had not delayed filing suit based on
the defendant's conduct because "her husband informed Hospital personnel that he
did not intend to release it from liability," and because the plaintiff retained an
attorney before the statute of limitations had run.78
In UnitedStatesv. Fidelity & CasualtyCo.,79 though, the Fourth Circuit found
that the reliance element of equitable estoppel may be satisfied even when the
plaintiff has retained counsel.80 However, "an attorney may not in some
circumstances bejustified in relying upon representations made to him, where a less
sophisticated citizen would still have access to the estoppel doctrine."8 Ultimately,
employment of an attorney is, of course, only one factor courts consider in
determining whether a plaintiff reasonably relied on the defendant's
representations.82
B. Defendant's Conduct in Settlement Negotiations
The South Carolina courts have clearly articulated that plaintiffs may not rely
on settlement negotiations alone when asserting equitable estoppel.83 As discussed
earlier, inBlackv. Lexington SchoolDistrictTwo the supreme court did not discuss
whether the elements of knowledge or reliance were met, rather it simply stated that
"settlement negotiations or statements expressing interest in settlement are
insufficient to give rise to a claim that a defendant is equitably estopped from
asserting the statute of limitations.""
Generally, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled in Rink v. Richland

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 308, 443 S.E.2d at 911.
Id. at 307, 443 S.E.2d at 910.
Id.
Id.; see supranote 12.
See Vines, 314 S.C. at 307, 443 S.E.2d at 910.
Id. at 308, 443 S.E.2d at 911 (quoting the plaintiff).
Id. at 308-09, 443 S.E.2d at 911.
402 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1968).

80. Id. at 899.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 900 n.9.
83. See, e.g., Gadsden v. Southern R.R., 262 S.C. 590, 206 S.E.2d 882 (1974) (finding that
negotiations had been initiated but not finalized).
84. Black v. Lexington Sch. Dist. Two, 327 S.C. 55, 63, 488 S.E.2d 327, 331 (1997).
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MemorialHospitals5 that the plaintiff was barred from bringing a second suit after
his first suit had been dismissed without prejudice because the statute of limitations
had run. 6 The Rink court quoted Clements v. Greenville County 7 with approval in
stating that equitable estoppel is generally applied "when the plaintiff has been
induced or relies on the defendant's conduct or promises that a settlement will be
made and does not file suit until the statute of limitations has run. '' ss
However, subsequent decisions by the supreme court and court of appeals have
opined that unfinalized settlement negotiations are not sufficient evidence to estop
a defendant from asserting a statute of limitations defense. 9 In Gadsdenv. Southern
Railroadsettlement negotiations were undertaken but never finalized.9" The South
Carolina Supreme Court concluded that equitable estoppel was not applicable
because "'there was no promise orally and certainly not in writing to waive or not
to plead the statute,' [and] there [was] no evidence that the defendant made any
misrepresentations or misled the plaintiff or her counsel."'"
More recently, the court of appeals found in Moates v. Bobb that equitable
estoppel was not applicable when an insurance company sent the plaintiff's attorney
a check with a note stating that the check was "'an advance[ment] towards the
settlement' of the claim."' The court stated that "[a] review of the record in this
case shows [plaintiffs attorney] did not even begin settlement negotiations, let
alone finalize them."93 However, the South Carolina Court of Appeals has
concluded that negotiations accompanied by other acts may be sufficient to estop
the use of the statute of limitations as a defense.94 In Dillon County School District
Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc. the court of appeals ruled that some of the
defendants were equitably estopped from asserting the statute of frauds as a defense
because the defendants designed and constructed a roof for the high school, and
then once defects in the roof were discovered, the defendants assured the plaintiff
that the roof would be repaired so that litigation would be unnecessary.95 The

85. 310 S.C. 193, 422 S.E.2d 747 (1992).
86. Id. at 197,422 S.E.2d at 749. The plaintiff argued that when the court granted him a voluntary
dismissal, the order stated that a more detailed order regarding costs taxed against the plaintiff would
be forthcoming and that he could not pay or refile until the more detailed order was issued. The
plaintiff did file before the more detailed order was issued, but after the statute of limitations had run.

Id.
87. 246 S.C. 20, 142 S.E.2d 212 (1965).
88. Rink, 310 S.C. at 198, 422 S.E.2d at 749.
89. See Gadsden v. Southern R.R., 262 S.C. 590, 592, 206 S.E.2d 882, 883 (1974); Moates v.
Bobb, 322 S.C. 172, 175, 470 S.E.2d 402, 403 (Ct. App. 1996).
90. Gadsden, 262 S.C. at 592, 206 S.E.2d at 883.
91. Id (quoting the lower court).
92. Moates, 322 S.C. at 174, 470 S.E.2d at 403 (quoting the note).
93. Id. at 175, 470 S.E.2d at 403.
94. Dillon County Sch. Dist. Two v Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 286 S.C. 207, 332 S.E.2d
555 (Ct. App. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l
Vendors, 319 S.C. 556, 462 S.E.2d 858 (1995).
95. Id. at 219, 332 S.E.2d at 562.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1998

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 5 [1998], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:957

defendants' assurances were accompanied by visits to the school and "numerous
attempts to repair the roof."96 The court found that the defendants' other acts were
sufficient to induce the plaintiff to delay filing a claim.'
South Carolina courts have yet to address whether estoppel should apply when
settlement negotiations are in the final stages at time the statute of limitations runs
and then negotiations are broken off or breached by the defendant. The court may
find that "'the delay that otherwise would give operation to the statute had been
induced by the defendant's conduct"'9 5 and that estoppel could therefore be applied.
Additionally, if the plaintiff could establish that the defendant had undertaken the
negotiations in bad faith, the court may estop the defendant from asserting the
statute of limitations defense." However, given the court's general approach to
settlement negotiations and claims of estoppel, the court is unlikely to apply
estoppel in cases involving bad faith when negotiations are in the early stages, or
when the parties have only expressed an interest in settlement.
The South Carolina rulings which conclude that settlement negotiations are not
sufficient to establish equitable estoppel suggest that a plaintiff should file a claim
even if it appears that settlement will be reached." ° These rulings discourage
settlement negotiations, contrary to the policies ofthe state"1 and federal courts.'" 2
"Settlement agreements are encouraged as a matter of public policy because they
promote the amicable resolution of disputes and lighten the increasing load of
litigation faced by courts."' 3 Given this generally accepted policy, perhaps South
Carolina courts should reconsider their prior decisions that unfinalized settlement
negotiations do not bar the use of the statute of limitations as a defense to assertions

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Wiggins v. Edwards, 314 S.C. 126, 130, 442 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1994) (quoting Dillon County
Sch. Dist. Two, 286 S.C. at 218, 332 S.E.2d at 561).
99. See Black v. Lexington School DistrictTwo, 327 S.C. 55, 64,488 S.E.2d 327, 331-32 (1997),
citing Lockard v. Deitch, 855 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993), for the proposition that "settlement

negotiations between a plaintiff and defendant do not constitute a waiver of the defendant's right to
assert the statute of limitations."
100. See Gadsden v. Southern R.R., 262 S.C. 590,206 S.E.2d 882 (1974); Moates v. Bobb, 322
S.C. 172, 470 S.E.2d 402 (Ct. App. 1996).
101. Darden v. Witham, 258 S.C. 380, 388, 188 S.E.2d 776, 778 (1972) ("The courts favor
settlements and agreements amongst litigants, and regard as commendable efforts by the parties to settle
their differences without the courts' intervention or assistance.").
102. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1,5 (1985) ("The plain purpose ofRule 68 is to encourage
settlement and avoid litigation."); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971) ("[P]rivate
structuring of individual relationships and repair of their breach is largely encouraged in American life,
subject only to the caveat that the formal judicial process, if resorted to, is paramount."); Bergh v.
Department of Transp., 794 F.2d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("The law favors settlement of cases.");
United States v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 402 F.2d 893, 899 (4th Cir. 1968) ("To adopt a rule that
employment of counsel precludes resort to equitable estoppel would constitute a departure from the
salutary.policy of encouraging the amicable settlement of legal disputes without resort to the courts
103. D.R. v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d 896, 901 (3d Cir. 1997).
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of equitable estoppel.
Finally, although South Carolina courts should reconsider whether settlement
negotiations alone are per se insufficient to merit equitable estoppel, Blackpresents
a case in which the court's finding was appropriate. The school district's claims
adjuster did not misrepresent settlement opportunities to the plaintiff's attorney.'
Arguably, the claims adjuster might have known whether settlement would actually
take place before the running of the statute. However, according to the untimely
affidavit of Black's former lawyer, the adjuster merely stated that "'he was
confident [they] could settle this matter if he had an opportunity to complete an
investigation.""' 5 The attorney was a knowledgeable party. He should have known
that claims adjusters generally assertthat settlements seem possible, especially when
the alternative is costly litigation. Furthermore, the adjuster in Black "'did not
accept liability on behalf ofthe school district.""' 6 The attorney could have pressed
the adjuster to come to a settlement, or he could have discussed settlement with the
school district before the statute of limitations ran.
IV. SHOULD EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL BE AN ISSUE FOR THE JUDGE OR THE JURY?

In Gaymon v. Richland Memorial Hospital the supreme court held that
equitable estoppel is an issue to be decided by the judge rather than thejury.0 7 This
decision is a departure from a prior line ofcases which noted that equitable estoppel
was a question of fact for the jury.0 8 South Carolina courts had generally held that
equitable issues are for the judge and issues of fact are for the jury."° In Floyd v.
Floyd"' the South Carolina Supreme Court stated:
In a line of cases dating back almost a century our Court has held, with
only slight modifications, that where the issues raised by pleadings are
partly equitable, it is not error to deny a motion to have all the issues tried
by jury, though the right exists to have purely legal questions so tried."'

104. See Black, 327 S.C. at 65, 488 S.E.2d at 332.
105. Id. (quoting the affidavit of Black's original lawyer)
106. Id. (quoting the affidavit of Black's original lawyer) (emphasis omitted).
107. Gaymon v. Richland Mem'l Hosp., 327 S.C. 66, 68, 488 S.E.2d 332, 333 (1997).
108. See Vines v. Self Mem'l Hosp., 314 S.C. 305, 309, 443 S.E.2d 909, 911 (1994); Koren v.
National Home Life Assurance Co., 277 S.C. 404, 407, 288 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1982); Lovell v. C. A.
Timbes, Inc., 263 S.C. 384, 389-90, 210 S.E.2d 610, 612 (1974); Dillon County Sch. Dist. Two v.
Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 286 S.C. 207, 219, 332 S.E.2d 555, 561 (Ct. App. 1985), overruled
on othergrounds by Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, 319 S.C. 556, 462 S.E.2d
858 (1995); Oswald v. County ofAiken, 281 S.C. 298, 303-04,315 S.E.2d 146, 150 (Ct. App. 1984).
109. See, e.g., Johnson v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 292 S.C. 51, 56, 354 S.E.2d 895, 897
(1987) ("If [legal and equitable] claims are to be tried in a single proceeding and there are factual issues
common to both claims, the jury shall fir-st determine the legal issues. The court may then determine
the equitable claims .... ).
110. 306 S.C. 376, 412 S.E.2d 397 (1991).
111. Id. at 379, 412 S.E.2d at 398.
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Over the years South Carolina courts had modified this general rule in cases dealing
with equitable estoppel.' 2 The supreme court seemed to agree that "'[equitable
estoppel] is a question of fact for the jury whether the acts, representations ....
lulled the plaintiffinto a sense of security, preventing him from filing suit before the
running of the statute.""' 3
However, in Gaymon the supreme court returned to its general view that
equitable issues are to be decided by the judge. The Gaymon court found that the
prior decisions indicating that equitable estoppel was "a question of fact for the
jury" were not dispositive because those cases did not rule specifically on whether
equitable estoppel was an issue for the jury or for the court sitting in equity.," The
court opined that while those cases were "correctly cited for the proposition that
equitable estoppel may involve a question of fact for the factfinder, it is mere
dictum that such a question of fact is for a jury."".. The Gaymon court relied on
older South Carolina case law" 6 and the more recent decision in Floyd"7 in
determining that when equitable estoppel is combined in a case with issues of law,
the estoppel issue should be tried by the court."' This finding was reiterated by the
court in Black."9
In contrast, federal courts have placed an emphasis on protecting the right to a
jury trial. In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover' the United States Supreme Court
noted "that only under the most imperative circumstances... can the right to ajury
trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims.' ' 12'
Indeed, the federal courts have been inclined to expand the role of the jury and to
make jury trials more widely available." For example, in Overstreet v. Kentucky
CentralLifeInsuranceCo. " the Fourth Circuit has ruled that a defendant's conduct
may raise an issue of material fact for the jury regarding equitable estoppel. 4 In
short, "[t]here is some authority in the states for refusing to allow the extension of
112. See Vines, 314 S.C. at 309, 443 S.E.2d at 911; Lovell, 263 S.C. at 389-90, 210 S.E.2d at
612; Green v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 250 S.C. 58, 61,156 S.E.2d 318, 319 (1967); Dillon County
Sch. Dist. Two, 286 S.C. at 219, 332 S.E.2d at 561.
113. Lovell, 263 S.C. at 389-90, 210 S.E.2d at 612 (quoting 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation ofActions
§ 433 (1970)).
114. Gaymon v. Richland Mem'l Hosp., 327 S.C. 66, 68, 488 S.E.2d 332, 333 (1997).
115. Id.
116. Id.(citing Knight v. Stroud, 212 S.C. 39, 46 S.E.2d 169 (1948); Atlantic & Charlotte Air
Line Ry. Co. v. Victor Mfg. Co., 79 S.C. 266, 60 S.E. 675 (1908); Quattlebaum v. Taylor, 45 S.C. 512,

23 S.E. 617 (1896)).
117. Id. (citing Floyd v. Floyd, 306 S.C. 376,412 S.E.2d 397 (1991)).
118. Id. at 68, 488 S.E.2d at 333.
119. Blackv. Lexington Sch. Dist. Two, 327 S.C. 55,62 n.1, 488 S.E.2d 327,330-31 n.1 (1997).
120. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
121. Id. at 511.
122. 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2302.1, at 33 (2d ed. 1995) ("In its decisions since 1962 the Court has shown no inclination to retreat
from this judgment that jury trial is now more widely available than it had been in the past.").
123. 950 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1991).
124. Id. at 942.
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jury trial to matters that historically were equitable, but this has never been the rule
in the federal courts."'"
If a South Carolina practitioner brings an action in federal court or removes an
action to federal court, then based on Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative 6 and Hannav. Plumer1 7 it would appear that the issue of equitable
estoppel will go to the jury. 2 ' The Byrd Court stressed the strong federal policy
favoring jury trials and reiterated that "'state laws cannot alter the essential
character or function of a federal court.""' 1 9 The Supreme Court subsequently ruled
in Hanna that when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governed an issue, the
federal rule would prevail over a state rule.' In dicta, the court stated that when a
federal rule is not involved, the court should apply state law if applying a different
law in federal court would encourage forum shopping or result in "inequitable
administration of the laws.' 3' Because of the narrow holding in Hanna, many
courts continue to look beyond Hanna for guidance. 32 Regardless of whether a
federal court applies Byrd or Hanna, the court would probably send the issue of
because of the federal system's strong interest in
equitable estoppel to the jury
33
submitting cases to the jury.
VI. CONCLUSION
South Carolina practitioners should be wary of continuing pre-filing
negotiations as the statute of limitations period runs out. Under South Carolina law,
reliance on settlement negotiations will not defeat a statute of limitations defense.
As a result, practitioners should protect their clients by seeking an express
agreement from the opposing party during pre-filing settlement negotiations that the
opposing party will not assert a statute of limitations defense if a suit must be
ultimately filed. If this protection is not feasible, the practitioner should file suit

prior to the running of the statute of limitations to preserve the claim. An attorney
who delays filing suit under these circumstances may face an unsympathetic court,

supra note 122, § 2317, at 131 (footnote omitted).
126. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).

125. WRIGHT&MILLER,

127. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
128. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-38 (holding that the state "policy of uniform enforcement of statecreated rights and obligations" must yield to the federal system's allocation of "functions between judge
and jury").
129. Id. at 539 (quoting Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94 (1931)).
130. Hanna,380 U.S. at 473-74.
131. Id. at 467-69.
132. See Mayer v. Gary Partners & Co., 29 F.3d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Byrd and
holding that "[w]hether the trier of fact is ajury, ajudge, or a magistrate judge... is a subject for the
forum's own law"); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1965) (recognizing
Hanna,but stating that it is necessary to go on and ask "whether the [state] rule embodies important
policies that would be frustrated by the application of a different federal jurisdictional rule and, if so,
is this policy to be overridden because of a stronger federal policy?").
133. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538.
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instead of ajury-and a malpractice suit.
Laura Wilcox Howle
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IT COULDN'T HAPPEN HERE: THE ENGLISH RULE
-BUT NOT IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I.

INTRODUCTION

Does the United States Constitution give rise to a right of action for a violation
ofthe Fourth Amendment?' In the landmark case ofBivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents ofFederalBureau ofNarcotics, the United States Supreme Court decided
that such a right does exist.' Had a bill pending before the South Carolina General
Assembly in 1997 been a law in force in New York in 1967, the United States
Supreme Court may never have had the opportunity to decide Bivens.4 The South
Carolina bill' is designed to reduce litigation in South Carolina courts by imposing
1.The Fourth Amendment provides that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens narcotics agents mistakenly entered Mr. Bivens's apartment
and conducted an illegal search and seizure. Id.at 389. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York found that it lacked jurisdiction over the case and that no cause of action arose
directly under the Fourth Amendment. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 276 F. Supp. 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). Furthermore, the court ruled that any appeal would be
frivolous and denied the plaintiff's motion to appeal informapauperis.Id. at 16. The Second Circuit
Court ofAppeals also denied the appeal. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390. Reversing the decision ofthe District
Court, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a cause of action did indeed arise under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 397-98.
3. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
4. See supranote 2.
5. S.193, 112th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997). Because the text of the bill may not now
be readily accessible, the bill is set out below.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina:
SECTION 1. Sections 15-36-10 and 15-36-20 of the 1976 Code are
amended to read:
"Section 15-36-10. (A) Any person who takes part in the procurement,
initiation, continuation, or defense of any civil proceeding is subject to being
assessed for payment of all or a portion of the attorney's fees and court costs of
the other party if:
(1) he does so primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the
proper discoveryjoinder ofparties, or adjudication ofthe claim upon which
the proceedings are based; or
(2) the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person seeking an
assessment of the fees and costs.
As used in this chapter, 'person' is defined to mean any individual,
corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, society, joint stock
company, and any other entity, including any governmental entity or
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sanctions on parties falling within its scope. Senate bill 193 would amend the
Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act.6 Similar to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the current version of this Act requires the parties to petition
the court for a fee award, 8 and the amount of the award is left to the court's

unincorporated association of persons.
(3)Attorney's fees and costs shall be assessed under this chapter whenever
a motion to dismiss for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action, a motion for summary judgment, a motion for a directed verdict, or a
motion for an involuntary nonsuit is granted in favor of the person seeking an
assessment of the fees and costs.
Section 15-36-20. (A) Any person who takes part in the procurement,
initiation, continuation, or defense of civil proceedings must be considered to
have acted to secure a proper purpose as stated in item (1)of Section 15-36-10
if he reasonably believes in the existence of the facts upon which his claim is
based and
(1)reasonably believes that under those facts his claim may be valid
under the existing or developing law; or
(2) relies upon the advice of counsel, sought in good faith and given
after full disclosure of all facts within his knowledge and information which
may be relevant to the cause of action; or
(3) believes, as an attorney of record, in good faith that his
procurement, initiation, continuation, or defense of a civil cause is not
intended to merely harass or injure the other party.
(B)A proper purpose shall not be found under subsection (A) if a motion to
dismiss for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, a motion
for summary judgment, a motion for a directed verdict, or a motion for an
involuntary nonsuit is granted in favor of the person seeking an assessment of the
fees and costs."
SECTION 2. Section 15-36-40 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"Section 15-36-40, (A) In a motion filed pursuant to this chapter the
aggrieved person has the burden of proving:
(1) the other party has procured, initiated, continued, or defended the
civil proceedings against him;
(2) the proceedings were terminated in his favor;
(3) the primary purpose for which the proceedings were procured,
initiated, continued, or defended was not that of securing the proper
discovery, joinder of parties, or adjudication of the civil proceedings;
(4) the aggrieved person has incurred attorney's fees and court costs;
and
(5) the amount of the fees and costs set forth in item (4).
(B)The granting of a motion to dismiss for failure to state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action, a motion for summary judgment, a motion for a
directed verdict, or a motion for an involuntary nonsuit in favor of the person
seeking an assessment of the fees and costs shall satisfy the burden provided for
in subsection (A)."
SECTION 3. This act takes effect upon approval by the Governor.
Id.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-36-10 to -50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
7. FED. R CIv.P. 11.
8. S.C. CODEANN. § 15-36-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
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discretion. 9 To be entitled to an award, the petitioning party must prevail."
The passage of S. 193 would create a mechanical statute with no judicial
discretion. The bill requires that the court impose the fees and costs of a lawsuit on
the losing party when the judge enters judgment resulting from motions to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, summary judgment, directed verdict, or involuntary
nonsuit." The bill would create a new twist to the old "English Rule." The English
Rule is an invention of English common law; its application requires the loser of a
lawsuit to pay the victorious party's attorney's fees and costs. 2
The purpose of this Note is to evaluate the likely benefit of the proposed
legislation on South Carolina's court system. First, this Note examines the English
Rule and its impact in the United Kingdom. Second, the discussion focuses on an
analysis of Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 82, a true "loser pays" rule. Third,
the Note then compares the South Carolina proposal to Rule 82, the English Rule,
and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, this Note concludes
with alternatives to the proposed statute.
II.BACKGROUND
A. The Two Basic Rules
1.

The English Rule ofLoser Pays: The EnglishLose

American legal reformers often advocate the English Rule, or "loser pays"
system, as the solution to an overburdened American court system-a system of
backlogs and overloaded dockets. 3 The continuing use of the English Rule in a
judicial structure so similar to our own offers a valuable opportunity to examine the
Rule in operation. The English Rule allows the prevailing party in a lawsuit to
recover legal fees, court costs, and any other related costs (such as those of expert
witnesses) from the losing party. 4 This practice of fee shifting allows parties to be
made whole by recovering costs that they would not have borne but for the other

9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-36-50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
10. S.C. CODEANN. § 15-36-10(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
11. S. 193, 112th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997).
12. Herbert M. Kritzer, The English Experience with the English Rule: How "Loser Pays"
Works, What Difference it Makes, and What Might Happen Here I (Disputes Processing Research
Program Working Paper No. DPRP 11-4, June 22, 1992).
13. See, e.g., id.at 1 n.1 (referring to former Vice President Quayle's endorsement of a proposal
to impose the English Rule in diversity cases in federal courts).
14. Id. at 2. Typically, costs are paid even in settlements. Id. at 2 n.4. But cf.John C. Evans,
England'sNew ConditionalFee Agreements: How Will They Change Litigation?,63 DEF. COUNS.
J. 376 (1996) (describing the recent changes in English law that allow contingency fees in certain types
oflitigation); Walter Olson & David Bernstein, LoserPays: Where Next?, 55 MD.L.REv.1161, 1165
& n.19 (1996) (noting that some British authorities are encouraging a shift to the American rule as a
result of increased government expenses from programs such as legal aid).
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party's actions." Barristers 6 rarely argue over what constitutes reasonable fees
because "there is a well-established set of norms as to what various aspects of legal
representation should cost."'" The reasonableness of fees is one of many issues that
the South Carolina courts must confront if the proposed South Carolina rule
becomes law.
Ideally, the application of the English Rule would engender a true two-way fee
shifting system. The reality is far different. Fee shifting systems often hold the
defendant, typically large entities and not individuals, accountable for the plaintiff s
fees; in contrast, plaintiffs are rarely held responsible for the defendant's expenses.'
Furthermore, the rule "takes no account of the conduct of the parties during the
course of the litigation,"' 9 which is particularly important because the parties'
conduct, especially that ofthe attorneys, is typically the problem cited in complaints
about frivolous litigation.2"
Perhaps the greatest concern about the application of the English Rule is that
it will deter a great many persons from bringing meritorious suits because of the
possibility of being responsible for attorneys' fees and court costs that could be
economically crippling.' Patrick Devlin, a British Judge, noted that "'[e]veryone
knows, every lawyer particularly knows, that for the ordinary citizen unqualified for
Legal Aid... a lawsuit is financially quite out of the question."' 2 The numbers
speak for themselves. "There are 70,000 product liability suits pending annually in
the United States, compared with only 200 in the United Kingdom."' u The United
Kingdom has a population of almost 59 million;24 the United States population is
more than 269 million.' Using these numbers, the United States has one products
liability suit for every 3,700 persons, whereas the British have only one such suit for
every 29,000 persons-a ratio difference of nearly eight to one. Even assuming that

15. See Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Cams, Alaska's English Rule: Attorney's Fee Shifting
in Civil Cases, 13 ALASKA L. REv. 33, 36 (1996).
16. A banister is defined as an English "advocate; a counsellor learned in the law who has been
admitted to plead at the bar, and who is engaged in conducting the trial or argument of causes."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 151 (6th ed. 1990).
17. Kritzer, supranote 12, at 2.
18. Id. at 3.
19. John Heaps & Kathryn Taylor, The Abuser Pays: The Control of UnwarrantedDiscovery,
41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 615, 619 (1997).
20. Telephone Interview with Senator Larry Martin, Member of the South Carolina Senate (Nov.
15, 1997). Senator Martin introduced S. 193 into the Senate in 1997.
21. Kritzer, supranote 12, at 3.
22. Id. at 3-4 (quoting PATRICK DEVLIN, THE JUDGE 69 (1979)). Plaintiffs are often supported
by Legal Aid, an extensive social system that covers legal costs for eligible litigants. Id. at 4. As a
matter of public policy, Legal Aid is not required to pay the opposing party's fees and costs. Id. at 5.
23. Dick Thomburgh, America's Civil JusticeDilemma: The Prospectsfor Reform, 55 MD. L.
REV. 1074, 1074 n.1 (1996).
24. U.S. Bureau of the Census, InternationalData Base (visited June 19, 1998)
<http:llwww.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbsprd>.
25. US. Census Bureau (last modified June 19, 1998)
<http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html>.
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the British people as a whole are less litigious than Americans, the difference in the
numbers is staggering. While this Note does not discuss the cultural differences
between the two nations, such a discrepancy is difficult to explain without
considering the deterrent effect of the English Rule.
Ifthe English Rule does eliminate frivolous litigation, it does so at considerable
societal expense. Because "[tihose rich enough to litigate, whether individuals or
corporations, [would] have a lethal advantage" in a loser pays system, the middle
and lower classes of society are at a greater risk of exploitation.2' However, final
judgment on the potential effect of the adoption of the English Rule in South
Carolina is best withheld until its effect on an American system is examined.
Fortunately, the opportunity for such an examination exists because Alaska employs
a version of the English Rule."
2. A BriefHistory of the American Rule
The English Rule is not foreign to American shores. In pre-revolutionary times,
the young British colonies actually.followed the English Rule of loser pays.28 The
colonial version of fee shifting, however, differed in one important aspect: colonial
authorities also regulated the maximum amount an attorney could charge for his
services.29 Following the American Revolution, opposition to government
regulation led to the repeal of caps on attorneys' fees." As the nineteenth century
ended, courts interpreted statutes as barring the award of attorneys' fees and so
denied attorneys' fees in awards for damages.3' "The term 'American Rule' came
into use in the early twentieth century to describe the practice of requiring each side
to pay its own attorneys' fees."32 Despite the prevalence of the American rule,33
limited statutorily authorized fee shifting measures are now in place throughout this
country. 4 Legislatures typically enacted these statutes to encourage, not discourage,
litigation that promotes the enforcement of public policies. 5

26. Keith Evans, Beware the English Rule!, WEST LEGAL NEws, Sept. 27, 1996, available in
1996 WL 545554.
27. ALASKA R.Civ. P. 82; see infra Part II.B.
28. Di Pietro & Cams, supranote 15, at 36-37.
29. Id. at 37.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. AccordingtoBlack'sLawDictionary,"[tjhe traditional 'American Rule' is that attorney fees
BLACK'S
are not awardable to the winning party (i.e. each litigant must pay his own attorney fees) .....
LAW DICTIONARY 82 (6th ed. 1990).
34. Di Pietro & Cams, supra note 15, at 37.
35. Id. Examples of such statutes can be found throughout civil rights, environmental, and
consumer protection law. Id.
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B. Alaska's Rule 82: Ambiguous Results
Alaska, through historical accident,36 employs the most comprehensive loser

pays statute in the United States: Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82. Rule 82

36. Id. at 38-46. Alaska's Rule 82 dates back to the mid-1800s. Id.at 38. Following the purchase
of the Alaskan territory from Russia, Congress declared that Oregon law would govern the new
American territory. Id. at 37-38. Oregon laws at that time permitted the "prevailing party to recover
certain costs" in some types of actions. Id. at 39. As the English Rule was phased out throughout the
remainder of the nation, Alaska retained it as a part of its judicial system. Id. at 38-46.
37. ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 82. The text of the rule follows.
(a) Allowance to Prevailing Party. Except as otherwise agreed to by the
parties, the prevailing party in a civil case shall be awarded attorneys' fees
calculated under this rule.
(b) Amount of Award.
(1) The court shall adhere to the following schedule in fixing the award
of attorneys' fees to a party recovering a money judgment in a case:
Judgment
and, if
Awarded,
Prejudgment

Contested

Contested
Without

Non-

Interest

With Trial

Trial

Contested

First

$ 25,000

20%

18%

10%

Next
Next
Over

$ 75,000
$400,000
$500,000

10%
10%
10%

8%
6%
2%

3%
2%
1%

(2) In cases in which the prevailing party recovers no money judgment,
the court shall award the prevailing party in a case which goes to trial 30
percent of the prevailing party's reasonable actual attorneys' fees which
were necessarily incurred, and shall award the prevailing party in a case
resolved without trial 20 percent of its actual attorneys' fees Which were
necessarily incurred. The actual fees shall include fees for legal work
customarily performed by an attorney but which was delegated to and
performed by an investigator, paralegal or law clerk.
(3) The court may vary an attorney's fee award calculated under
subparagraph (b)(1) or (2) of this rule if, upon consideration of the factors
listed below, the court determines a variation is warranted:
(A)the complexity of the litigation;
(B) the length of trial;
(C)the reasonableness of the attorneys' hourly rates and the
number of hours expended;
(D)the reasonableness of the number of attorneys used;
(E) the attorneys' efforts to minimize fees;
(F) the reasonableness of the claims and defenses pursued by
each side;
(G)vexatious or bad faith conduct;
(H) the relationship between the amount of work performed and
the significance of the matters at stake;

(I)the extent to which agiven fee award may be so onerous to the
non-prevailing party that it would deter similarly situated litigants
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss5/6
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shifts the amount of costs and fees to the losing party based on both the amount of

judgment and prejudgment interest and on whether or not the case went to trial.3"

In 1996 researchers published an article summarizing an empirical study of Rule
82."'Interestingly, the researchers concluded "that attorney's fee shifting in Alaska

from the voluntary use of the courts;
(J) the extent to which the fees incurred by the prevailing party
suggest that they had been influenced by considerations apart from the
case at bar, such as a desire to discourage claims by others against the
prevailing party or its insurer; and
(K) other equitable factors deemed relevant.
If the court varies an award, the court shall explain the reasons for the
variation.
(4) Upon entry ofjudgment by default, the plaintiff may recover an
award calculated under subparagraph (b)(1) or its reasonable actual fees
which were necessarily incurred, whichever is less. Actual fees include fees
for legal work performed by an investigator, paralegal, or law clerk, as
provided in subparagraph (b)(2).
(c) Motions for Attorneys' fees. A motion is required for an award of
attorneys' fees under this rule or pursuant to contract, statute, regulation, or law.
The motion must be filed within 10 days after the date shown in the clerk's
certificate of distribution on the judgment as defined by Civil Rule 58.1. Failure
to move for attorneys' fees within 10 days, or such additional time as the court
may allow, shall be construed as a waiver ofthe party's rightto recover attorneys'
fees. A motion for attorneys' fees in a default case must specify actual fees.
(d)Determination of Award. Attorneys' fees upon entry of judgment by
default may be determined by the clerk. In all other matters the court shall
determine attorneys' fees.
(e)Equitable Apportionment Under AS 09.17.080. In a case in which
damages are apportioned among the parties under AS 09.17.080, the fees awarded
to the plaintiff under (b)(1) of this rule must also be apportioned among the
parties according to their respective percentages of fault. If the plaintiff did not
assert a direct claim against a third-party defendant brought into the action under

Civil Rule 14(c), then
(1)the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the portion of the fee award
apportioned to that party; and
(2)the court shall award attorneys' fees between the third-party
plaintiff and the third-party defendant as follows:
(A)if no fault was apportioned to the third-party defendant, the
third-party defendant is entitled to recover attorneys' fees calculated
under (b)(2) of this rule;
(B) if fault was apportioned to the third-party defendant, the
third-party plaintiff is entitled to recover under (b)(2) ofthis rule 30 or
20 percent of that party's actual attorneys' fees incurred in asserting
the claim against the third-party defendant.
(f) Effect of Rule. The allowance of attorneys' fees by the court in
conformance with this rule shall not be construed as fixing the fees between
attorney and client.
Id.
38. ALASKAR. Civ. P. 82(b).
39. Di Pietro & Cams, supra note 15.
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seldom played a significant role in civil litigation."40 Rule 82 was but one factor in
the mix of variables used to decide how, when, and under what circumstances an
action should be brought.4 ' Furthermore, because courts infrequently applied Rule
82, it apparently was not the deterrent to frivolous litigation that its drafters had
hoped.42 Moreover, "[s]ixty-four percent of attorneys interviewed said that Rule 82
did not deter frivolous litigation."' 3 When Rule 82 did influence the decisionmaking process of attorneys, its effects varied." Basically, when the Rule impacted
the decision of whether or not to sue, the Rule generally did what its supporters
(and, for that matter, its detractors) said it would do: frighten off those with weak
cases. 4 However, the researchers also found that Rule 82 caused those with modest
means to shy away from suing unless their cases were strong enough to predict
victory.46 Indeed, the potential application of Rule 82 sometimes actually
encouraged the filing of lawsuits that might otherwise have settled.47 For example,
citing Rule 82 as the reason, one defense attorney complained that a plaintiff with
a strong case filed suit without ever looking into the possibility of settlement.4" The
researchers concluded that "the three most apparent effects of Rule 82 were that it
(1) discouraged some middle class parties from filing cases that either wealthy or

poor plaintiffs would file, (2)discouraged some suits (or defenses) of questionable
merit and (3) encouraged litigation in strong cases that might otherwise settle. 49
III. THE SOUTH CAROLINA PROPOSAL
A. Explaining Senate Bill 193
On January 16, 1997, ° the introduction of S. 193 added a unique perspective

40. Id. at 77.
41. Id. at 77-78.
42. Id. at 78. Rule 82 awards were made in only 10% of the state cases and 6% of federal cases.
Id. at 78. Even when awards were imposed under the rule, only 40% of those liable for such awards
ever paid. Id.

43. Id. at 81.
44. Id. at 79-82.
45. Di Pietro & Cams, supra note 15, at 79-8 1.

46. Id. at 79. The researchers found that "[f]or those who had assets to lose to an adverse attorney
fee award, Rule 82 assumed greater importance, along with the strength of the case, in the decision

whether to file." Id.
47. Id. at 79.
48. Id. A five-year Florida experiment encountered similar results. The Florida loser pays statute
applied only to medical malpractice suits, and its repeal was supported by the state medical association.
Philip Shuchman, It Isn'tThat the Tort Lawyers Are So Right,It's Just That the Tort Reformers Are
So Wrong, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 485, 537 (1997). Researchers studying the provision found that it
seemed to encourage litigation. Id.at 537 & n.278. Moreover, researchers found thatjury verdicts were
much larger in English Rule cases (mean of $69,390) than in American Rule cases (mean of $25,500).
Id. n.278.
49. Id. at 84.
50. Legislative News, S.C. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 51.
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to the loser pays idea."1 Senate bill 193 authorizes the award of fees and costs to a
plaintiff or defendant who wins a case on a dispositive motion. 2 The dispositive
motions outlined in S. 193 include the following: failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, motion for summary judgment, motion for a directed
verdict, and a motion for an involuntary nonsuit 3 The bill would not affect a case
litigated to a verdict.
Several gaps in the proposed legislation pose considerable administrative and
legal difficulties. First, no language in the bill suggests a method for determining
an award of attorneys' fees. Presumably, the presiding judge would have the
discretion to award reasonable attorneys' fees under generally accepted methods of
determining such awards. Second, the bill does not address whether parties may stay
any award of costs and fees without a bond requirement pending appeal. Finally, the
proposed legislation requires the party seeking an award under S. 193 to file the
motion. 4 Because the court cannot make an award of attorneys' fees on its own
motion, a party with a perceived "better" case may use the possibility of an award
of attorneys' fees as a bargaining chip to improve the terms of a settlement.
Senator Martin proposed the legislation to prevent big business from operating
recklessly and to prevent the "gumming up of the system.""5 He stresses that his bill
'5 6
will allow plaintiffs with legitimate causes of action to have their "day in court.
However, the Senator acknowledges that passage of this type of legislation is an
"uphill struggle" and so he is "open to fine tuning" the bill.5 In the end, he believes
that the opposition of the trial lawyers' lobby is likely to be strong enough to
prevent the enactment of S. 193."5

51. Only Oregon has come close to enacting a similar provision. See Olson & Bernstein, supra
note 14, at 1178-79. The original bill "provided that in all cases in which the amount claimed was less
than $20,000 the losing party would have to reimburse the prevailing party for all reasonable attorneys'
fees." Id. at 1178. However, the bill was substantially amended so that in its final form "a prevailing
party [could] collect a maximum of $500 in attorneys' fees, unless a party acted in bad faith or
frivolously, in which case the ceiling would rise to $5,000." Id. at 1179 (footnote omitted). The feeshifting system was also completely eliminated for summary judgments. Id.
52. S. 193, 112th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997). This unusual legislation is a result of
State Senator Larry Martin's personal experience with the judicial system. Telephone Interview with
Senator Larry Martin, supranote 20. Senator Martin is the author and sponsor of S. 193. The bill was
prompted by Senator Martin's experience with a summaryjudgment dismissal and his discovery of the
English Rule while watching a news program about lawyers. Id.
53. S. 193, 112th Gen. Assemby, 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997).
54. Id.
55. Telephone Interview with Senator Larry Martin, supranote 20.

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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B. Comparisons
1.

Senate Bill 193 and the English Rule

Senate Bill 193 and the English Rule are significantly different. Under S. 193,
plaintiffs may suffer prejudice. For example, a court may grant a defendant's motion
for summary judgment before a plaintiff has completed discovery. As a result, the
defendant may delay discovery, submit a dispositive motion to the court, and then
hope that the potential award of attorneys' fees will persuade the poorly funded
plaintiff to voluntarily withdraw the suit. Alternatively, a court may postpone
decision on a motion for summary judgment until the plaintiff has completed an
extensive, but fruitless, discovery expedition so that the plaintiff had every
opportunity to avoid a shift of attorneys' fees. As a result, costs of discovery may
become front loaded and increase litigation costs-exactly what reformers sought
to curtail.
The adoption of a modified English Rule in South Carolina would lead to
greater hardship in this state than in the United Kingdom because this country has
liberal discovery rules and does not have the extensive social welfare program,
Legal Aid. 9 Because the poor are typically judgment proof, it is the lower middle
classes that are vulnerable to exploitation under any version of the English Rule.'
The middle-class plaintiff with a house, family, and savings has the most to lose
from an adverse award of attorneys' fees.6 Therefore, when the potential of bearing
the other party's litigation expenses outweighs the potential gain of a meritorious
suit, lower-middle-class plaintiffs may not sue at all. 2
2. Senate Bill 193 andRule 82
Senate bill 193 and Rule 82 present strikingly different approaches to the same

problem. First, Rule 82's application to all civil lawsuits "[e]xcept as otherwise
agreed to by the parties"' contrasts sharply with S.193's application to dispositive
motions only.' Second, Rule 82 operates more mechanically than S.193. Rule 82

59. Kritzer, supranote 12, at 4 n.12. Legal Aid in England is a government-funded institution
accessible to eligible litigants. Id. at 8. No American equivalent exists. Numerous American public
legal service organizations exist, but none are as extensively funded as is Legal Aid. Id. The public
defender's office is not an appropriate comparison because that office is limited solely to criminal
cases.
60. Gerald Walpin, America's FailingCivil Justice System: Can We Learn From Other
Countries?,41 N.Y.L. SCH.L. REv. 647, 657 (1997).
61. Id.
62. See generallyLucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang,An Analysis ofFee Shifing Based
on the Marginof Victory: On FrivolousSuits, MeritoriousSuits,and the Role ofRule 11, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 371 (1996) (conducting an economic analysis of the decision to bring an action).
63. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(a).
64. S.193, 112th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997).
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provides a schedule that guides courts in determining awards, but still allows for
some variations based on certain complexities and conduct. 5 In contrast, S. 193
provides no such guidance to the judiciary; instead, the bill stipulates that certain
circumstances under which the court can award attorneys' fees and costs.'
3. Senate Bill 193 andRule 11 ofthe FederalRules of Civil Procedure
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure allows a court, upon the motion
of a party or on its own initiative, to sanction an attorney and the attorney's firm for
dilatory tactics or the bringing of a frivolous action. 7 The primary difference
between this sanctioning device and S. 193 is the power granted to judges. Senate
bill 193 requires a judge to award fees on a proper motion. 8 Rule 11, however, is
employed solely at the judge's discretion. 9 The fees awarded under Rule 11 are
limited to the amount necessary to deter like conduct.7"
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO LOSER PAYS
A number ofalternatives exist to enacting S. 193. Although proponents of legal
reform often decry that the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 "gutted many of [its]
provisions" by lowering the penalties leveled on attorneys and raising the bar for
their imposition,71 the Rule is one alternative available.72 Other commentators have
suggested more radical reforms of the current system, many of which Congress has
considered,73 including the following: (1) limiting noneconomic damages,74 (2)
capping punitive awards,7' (3) eliminating joint and several liability,76 (4) making
the "final seller of the product... immune from suit," (5) allowing "[p]rior
governmental approval as a defense,"78 (6) adopting a total set-off rule,79 (7)
"[r]einstat[ing] ...the 'state of the art' defense,""0 and finally (8) reevaluating the
65. ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 82(b).
66. S. 193, 112th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997).
67. Fed. R. Civ. P. ll(b), (c).
68. S.193, 112th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 1(c).
70. Id.
71. Olson & Bernstein, supra note 14, at 1167.
72. See Thornburgh, supra note 23, at 1086-87.
73. Shuchman, supra note 48, at 490. These bills include the Civil Justice Fairness Act of 1995,
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1995, Attorney Accountability Act of 1995, Lawsuit Reform Act of 1995,
Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995,
and the Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act. Id. at 493.
74. Id. at 488.
75. Id. at 488-89.
76. Id at 489.

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Shuchman, supranote 48, at 490.
80. Id.
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standards of liability.8 ' These proposals, which endorse radical revisions of"current
tort law ...and punitive damage issues,"" may "result in big accomplishments or
great mistakes."83 However, a wiser approach is that of incremental change. 4 Less
radical modifications, such as strengthening Rule 11 or increasing the use of the
current Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act,85 may go a long way toward
decreasing frivolous litigation without substantial effects on warranted litigation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Any statutory attempt to mechanically curtail "frivolous" litigation is doomed.
Thejudicial system, much like the operation of a democratic system, is not designed
to be an efficient one. Like the criminal system's philosophy "that it is better that
ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer,"86 the notion of restricting
an individual's access to the judicial system ought to be an anathema to every
American. If the cost of a balanced and open judicial system is the continued
presence of frivolous litigation, it is a small price to pay. "The prospect of 'loser
pays all' calls into question the availability ofjustice." s Such a rule may prevent
those in a similar position to Mr. Bivens. Instead of bringing suit, they may fear to
cross the threshold of the courthouse.
Keith Evans, a member of the English and California bars, has witnessed the
difference between the operation of the English Rule and the American Rule:
All through history, wherever there has been a thriving democracy,
there has always been a lot of litigation. The two go hand in hand and you
never get one without the other....
I know as well as anyone that a lot of thing need fixing in America's
legal system. Like every system of law there's ever been, it's very
imperfect. It's also much abused, especially by certain kinds of lawyers.
But none of those shortcomings is going to be fixed by doing away with
the availability of the law to the people of America. You mustn't let "the
English Rule" come to the United States-not if you value your
freedoms ....
.
Charles W.Branham, III*

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at491.
84. Id.
85. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-36-10 to -50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
86. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358-59.
87. Heaps & Taylor, supranote 19, at 619.
88. Evans, supranote 26.
* Thanks to Professor Stephen A. Spitz for his assistance and insight in writing this article.
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